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Donald R. Griffin, professor of
animal behavior at The Rockefeller
University, evaluates new multidisci
multidisci
plinary research that has renewed
interest in the question of animal cog
cog
nition and consciousness. His revised
and expanded edition of The Question
of Animal Awareness is an impressive
scientific and philosophical critique of
theories concern i ng man's qualitative
uniqueness. Griffin has expanded his
philosophical analysis of what it is to
have mental experiences and has elab
elab
orated on his criticisms of behaviorism
and positivism in light of new scien
scien
tific studies concerning the ways in
which certain birds, mammals and
insects communicate.
He also elabo
elabo
rates on
his general theme that
experimental participatory communica
communica
tion might provide us with a "window"
through which we can learn what ani
ani
mals are thinking about.
Griffin's
work is characterized by a rigorous
scientific approach to problems of
determining the extent to which non
non
human animals may be self-conscious.
He points out that in order to be con
con
vincing the data gathered should "be
validated by replication, independent
verification, and all the pertinent
controls customary in experimental
science. "
Dogmatic assumptions to the effect
that animals cannot be self-conscious
a re often based on the claim that
mentalistic terms are not susceptible
to precise definition and are useless
for scientific analysis.
Since Griffin
is optimistic about gathering scientifi
scientifi
cally verifiable data
about mental
images, intentions, and awa reness in
nonhuman animals, he is obviously
troubled by this type of objection.
He correctly notes that almost any
concept can be quibbled to death by

excessive insistence on exact opera
opera
tional
definitions.
Rather
than
engaging in pointless definitional dis
dis
putes, Griffin employs model con
con
struction or analogical reasoning to
determine mental experience.
In call
call
ing certain events "mental" philoso
philoso
phers usually mean that they are pri
pri
vate or di rectly known by one person
on Iy. G riffi n notes that if ta ken too
literally this precludes all knowledge
of human mental experience other than
that of oneself. He refuses to waste
effort replying to this type of scepti
scepti
cism.
Since indirect knowledge con
con
cerning the mental experience of other
people is generally considered reliable
and significant, the question is to
what extent we can apply this reason
reason
ing to other species.
Griffin contends that we can make
at least limited use of analogies when
it comes to nonhumans, although we
must do so cautiously. Mental experi
experi
ences are said to include the follow
follow
ing:
images,
feelings,
desires,
hopes, fears, sensations such as pain,
hunger, rage, affection, and thinking
about objects and events that are
remote in time and space as well as
beliefs
concerning
future
events.
Mental images need not be visual;
they may include a pattern of remem
remem
bered or imagined sounds, smells, or
tactile perceptions. Griffin finds no
difficulty in attributing beliefs about
the future to animals.
A hungry
wolf, he says, may believe, for exam
exam
ple, "If I chase that deer, I can catch
it, and it will taste good." Objections
to this type of theorizing are count
count
ered by citing numerous empirical
studies.
In addition, he points out
that animals are used as surrogates or
models for behavioral investigations on
the implicit assumption that principles

E&A 111/4

125
discovered in this way are applicable
to humans. According to Griffin, this
assumption implies qualitative continu
ity, and not difference in
kind,
between humans and other species.
He also notes that to the extent that
"basic
properties
of
neu rons,
synapses, and neuroendocrine mecha
nisms are similar, we might expect to
find comparably similar mental experi
ences.
It is well known that basic
neurophysiological functions are very
similar indeed in all multicellular ani
mals.
On this basis, we might be
justified in turning the original argu
ment of the strict behaviorists com
pletely upside down.
Because neu 1'0
physiological mechanisms appear to be
very similar in men and bees, the
mental
experiences
resulting
from
their operation must, according to this
line of reasoning, be equally similar."
127)

(p.

spite of any such similarities
awareness, many behav
ioral scientists contend that self-a
wareness is unique to humans. Grif
fin finds this a desperate attempt
which is prevalent among many philos
ophers,especially cartesians, to pre
. serve man's superiority.
Fi rst, ani
mals
a re
not
conscious.
When
evidence indicates the contrary, the
claim is that they are not self-con
scious.
However, says Griffin, this
"is one of a very few areas of cogni
tive ethology that have al ready been
illuminated by objective, verifiable
experiments."
He d rawson recent
research to support the claim that at
least some an imals are self-conscious.
. The experiments performed by Gallup,
for example, show that chimpanzees
and other Great Apes display an
intense interest in their own mirror
images.
Since they have learned to
use mirrors to examine parts of their
bodies which they cannot see di rectly,
Griffin suggests that they recognize
the mi 1'1'01' image as a· representation
of the self.

For the most part,· linguists and
philosophers have agreed with the
cartesian claim that language puts a
perfect distinction between man and
animal, that it establishes a clear dif
ference in kind, not degree. In light
of studies concerning the communica
tion of bees, bats, and chimpanzees,
Griffin considers this claim to be un
supported and dogmatic.
Experiments
indicate that vervet monkey alarm
calls share an important property with
human language, namely reference to
external objects and events. Fu rther,
it is argued by many scholars that if
animals use symbols, we must assume
that they have mental experiences
similar to humans.
Griffin's work
indicates that bee dances are highly
complex and definitely symbolic. Most
animal communication systems that he
has studied exhibit a degree of com
plexity that is analogous to human
linguistic exhange.

In

~oncerning

G riffi n p resents a n extended criti
que of Chomsky's
view that the
capacity for learning and using lan
guage is a species-specific human
characteristic.
According to Chom
sky, each "known animal communica
tion system either consists of a fixed
number of signals, each associated
with a specific range of eliciting con
ditions or internal states, or a· fixed
number of 'linguistic dimensions,' each
associated with a non-linguistic dimen
sion."

Griffin does not find empirical

evidence for this contention.
He
points out that it is difficult to deter
mine
whether
the
communication
behavior of any particular animal con
sists of an absolutely fixed number of
signals or to establish just what eli
citing conditions or internal states are
associated with each. It is quite pos
sible, he says, "that the perceived
rigidity and limitation to a few specific
conditions or states exists in the
minds of human commentators rather
than in the world of animal behavior."
(p.76)
His research indicates that
contrary to Chomsky's opinion, animal
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behavior and communication is adapta
ble to new situations and is even
creative under some ci rcumstances.
Chomsky would obviously object to
Griffin's suggestion of participatory
investigation of animal communication.
Griffin believes that we may be able
to determine what animals are thinking
about by a process of impersonation.
The approach, he says, "would be
di rect 'impersonation' of a similar
species, such as a chimpanzee, by an
adequately
disguised
experimenter
using the gestures and sounds char
acteristic of chimpanzee communica
tion." (p. 157)

presented in his book are not conclu
sive, that they are offered as hypoth
eses and not as fixed or dogmatic
assertions immune from challenge or
experimental testing..
We are,
he
points out, quite ignorant concerning
the mental experience of animals.
However, "open-minded agnosticism is
clearly a necessary first step" in
developing an experimental science of
cognitive ethology. Scholars will find
this work a fair assessment of cu rrent
research.
It is certainly a lively fact
filled text which. presents challenging
philosophical and scientific arguments
for the evolutionary continuity of
mental experience.

Griffin admits that the arguments
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